Mt. Holyoke v. California Coastal Commission

Filed 11/23/05 Mt. Holyoke Homes v. California Coastal Commission CA2/27

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

MT. HOLYOKE HOMES et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, Defendant, BARBARA SCHELBERT, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

B178633 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BS084800)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles, David P. Yaffe, Judge. Reversed.

Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro, John M. Bowman, Andrew R. Hunter and Ryan S. Mauck, for Plaintiffs and Appellants Mt. Holyoke Homes, Darla Jones and Stanley Jones.

No appearance for Defendant California Coastal Commission.

John B. Murdock for Real Party in Interest and Respondent Barbara Schelbert.

__________________________

Mt. Holyoke Homes, LP, Darla Jones and Stanley Jones appeal from the trial court’s judgment dismissing their petition for writ of mandate challenging the California Coastal Commission’s (Commission) denial of their proposed three-lot subdivision after granting their motion to approve a tentative settlement with the Commission and to remand the matter to the Commission for a further public hearing. We reverse.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. The Proposed Project and Administrative Proceedings

Darla and Stanley Jones own an undeveloped parcel of land on Mount Holyoke Avenue in the Pacific Palisades area of the City of Los Angeles (City). They formed Mt. Holyoke Homes, LP (MHH) for the purpose of developing the property. Barbara Schelbert owns a home across the street from the property.

MHH filed an application with the City for approval of a preliminary parcel map and a coastal development permit for a proposed four-lot subdivision on the property in September 1990. After review of grading reports and a public hearing, the City’s deputy advisory agency conditionally approved the parcel map and coastal development permit. A group of neighboring property owners appealed that approval to the Los Angeles Board of Zoning Appeals, which disapproved the parcel map and coastal development permit. MHH’s appeal to the Los Angeles City Council was denied. MHH and the Joneses filed a superior court action challenging the City’s disapproval. On December 22, 1993 the court issued a peremptory writ of mandate commanding the government respondents to set aside their decision and to reconsider the matter.

The city council referred the matter to its planning and land use management committee in January 1994. After Schelbert and others raised concerns regarding the impact of the proposed plan on views, MHH agreed to reduce the number of lots from four to three and to accept conditions of approval providing greater setbacks and view corridors between future homes. MHH submitted a revised three-lot subdivision plan to the City, but the City’s building department staff raised new concerns regarding soils and geology reports that previously had been approved. For the next four years additional reports were prepared, reviewed and finally approved by the building department on July 17, 1998. On March 16, 1999 the planning and land use management committee recommended approval of the parcel map and coastal development permit for the three-lot subdivision. The City approved the revised proposal on April 7, 1999.

In June 1999 Schelbert appealed the City’s approval to the Commission, which has jurisdiction because the property is located within the coastal zone. In May 2000 the Commission determined the appeal raised substantial issues regarding visual impacts and geological stability and would be reviewed de novo. Three years later, in May 2003, the Commission staff issued its report recommending conditional approval of the coastal development permit for the three-lot subdivision. Following a hearing on June 11, 2003, however, the Commission granted Schelbert’s appeal and disapproved the permit.

3. The Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint

MHH and the Joneses filed a verified petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief and inverse condemnation against the Commission, naming Schelbert as real party in interest, on July 31, 2003. The petition and complaint requested a writ of mandate on the grounds the Commission had violated the Public Resources Code by failing to hear the appeal in a timely manner and had abused its discretion in denying the coastal development permit; sought a declaration the Commission lacked jurisdiction in the matter because it had failed to act in a timely manner and because the appointment structure of the Commission violated the separation of powers clause of the California Constitution; and demanded damages for the inverse condemnation of the property.

In May 2004 MHH, the Joneses and the Commission entered into a tentative settlement, which provided the decision disapproving the coastal development permit would be vacated and the Commission would hold a new hearing on an alternative three-lot site plan with a larger view corridor. If the Commission approved the alternative site plan, MHH and the Jones agreed to dismiss their action with prejudice. The settlement agreement was presented to the trial court as a stipulation and proposed order vacating the Commission’s June 11, 2003 decision and remanding to the Commission for a new public hearing. The stipulation provided, “The Court shall retain jurisdiction in this matter pending the Commission’s decision on remand.”

The court signed the stipulation; but shortly thereafter, at a status conference attended by all parties to the action, including Schelbert, Schelbert explained she had not been a party to the settlement negotiations or the stipulation and objected to setting aside the Commission’s decision. The court acknowledged it had not noticed Schelbert had not agreed to or signed the stipulation and withdrew its approval. The court then deemed the stipulation a joint motion by MHH, the Joneses and the Commission to approve the settlement and remand to the Commission and gave the parties an opportunity to submit additional briefing.

A hearing was held after the court received the parties’ supplemental briefing. The court’s tentative decision was to grant the motion to set aside the Commission’s decision and to remand for consideration of the alternative proposal, but to issue a writ of mandate and dismiss the action rather than retain jurisdiction as set forth in the stipulation and proposed order previously submitted. During argument, counsel for MHH explained it had two causes of action in addition to its petition for writ of mandate and argued entry of judgment and dismissal of the action, as contemplated by the tentative ruling, was not appropriate. Although observing a split existed in appellate authority regarding the court’s power to enter an interlocutory remand order, the court appeared to accept MHH and the Joneses’ position that, if it granted the motion, it could in this case remand the matter to the Commission without vacating the original decision and retain jurisdiction because none of the parties appeared to object to that procedure. (At this point Schelbert’s objections were substantive and did not go to the form the court’s order might take if it adopted as its final decision its tentative ruling to remand the matter for a further public hearing before the Commission.)

Following the hearing the court issued its decision (by minute order) granting the motion to approve the settlement and stating, “Pursuant to the stipulation entered into between petitioners [MHH and the Jones] and respondent, the matter is remanded to respondent, Coastal Commission for further proceedings, including a new public hearing on petitioners’ application for a coastal development permit.” The court directed MHH and the Joneses to submit a proposed order.

The proposed order submitted by MHH and the Joneses granted the motion, remanded the matter to the Commission and provided the court would retain jurisdiction pending the Commission’s decision on remand. Schelbert filed an objection to the proposed order contending judgment should be entered, which Schelbert could then appeal, because there was no reason for the court to retain jurisdiction: If the Commission were to approve the new plan, there would be nothing for the court to review because the stipulation provided the action would be dismissed; if the Commission were to deny approval of the new plan, its denial would be subject to challenge based on a different site plan and administrative record. MHH, the Joneses and the Commission filed a joint reply contending, as they had during the hearing, that entry of judgment would be improper because the settlement agreement did not address the second and third related, but separate and distinct, causes of action in the complaint.

The court modified the proposed order, inserting in the caption the phrase “Judgment Dismissing Petition And” before “Order Remanding The Matter To Respondent California Coastal Commission For A New Public Hearing”; striking from the proposed order the language providing that the court would retain jurisdiction pending the Commission’s decision on remand; and replacing that language with the statement, “Objections to proposed order by real party in interest are overruled. Request for judgment is granted; objection thereto by petitioner and respondent is overruled.” The judgment was filed August 11, 2004.

4. The Commission Denies MHH’s Alternative Site Plan

Shortly after entry of the court’s judgment dismissing the petition and complaint, the Commission conducted a public hearing on the revised three-lot plan and thereafter voted to disapprove the coastal development permit. On March 14, 2005 MHH and the Joneses filed a new petition for writ of mandate and complaint in the superior court challenging the Commission’s denial of their revised plan; the pleading reasserts many of the allegations contained in the writ petition and complaint in the case at bar, but is directed to the revised three-lot plan.

DISCUSSION

1. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s dismissal of an action for abuse of discretion. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 331 [reviewing dismissal for failure to bring action to trial within two years after filing under former Code Civ. Proc., § 583, subd. (a)[1]]; Blue Chip Enterprises, Inc. v. Brentwood Sav. & Loan Assn. (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 706, 713 [reviewing dismissal for delay in bringing action to trial under court’s inherent power].) Discretion is abused only when the trial court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566; see Choice-In-Education League v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 415, 422 [“The scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being applied; action that transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law is outside the scope of discretion and we call such action an abuse of discretion.”].) However, “closer scrutiny” is given when dismissal is granted than when it is denied. (Salinas v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1, 17 [“The trial court’s decision to grant a dismissal motion [under § 583.310] should be given closer scrutiny than a decision to deny the motion.”].) “All doubts will be resolved in favor of the party attempting to get to trial.” (United Farm Workers National Union v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 225, 233 [reviewing dismissal for failure to bring action to trial within two years after filing under former § 583, subd. (a)].)

Courts also have the inherent power to control litigation before them. (Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967 [“‘inherent power entitles trial courts to exercise reasonable control over all proceedings connected with pending litigation . . . in order to insure the orderly administration of justice’”].) The exercise of such inherent power is also reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Santandrea v. Siltec Corp. (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 525, 530, disapproved on another point in Baugess v. Paine (1978) 22 Cal.3d 626. 639, fn. 8.)

2. The Superior Court Abused Its Discretion by Dismissing the Action

The superior court abused its discretion by dismissing MHH and the Joneses’ lawsuit over their objection.[2] Although not expressly denominated a request for a stay, MHH, the Joneses and the Commission essentially sought a continuance and stay of superior court proceedings to allow them to attempt to settle the dispute over the proposed subdivision through a new Commission proceeding to consider a revised project plan. Once the court realized Schelbert was not a party to the settlement discussions and had not signed the stipulation to remand and to retain jurisdiction, the court properly vacated its initial approval of the stipulation and proceeded to address the request to remand as if it been presented as a motion to approve the settlement. At that point, however, under the circumstances presented here the court’s only options were to grant the motion, to deny it or to permit the moving parties to present an alternative form of motion to approve the settlement between MHH and the Joneses, on the one hand, and the Commission, on the other hand, that adequately addressed whatever concerns the court may have had regarding the scope of its authority to order a remand.

After briefing and argument, the court concluded Schelbert’s objection to the settlement agreement ‑‑ that the Commission had violated the Brown Act (Gov. Code, § 54950 et seq.) by meeting with MHH and approving the settlement in private ‑‑ was unfounded. At that point the only remaining issue was whether the court had the authority to enter an order in the form proposed by MHH and the Joneses, consistent with the terms of the settlement agreement and earlier stipulation, remanding the matter to the Commission for a new public hearing, but providing the court would retain jurisdiction in case the Commission denied the alternative site plan, thereby permitting MHH and the Joneses to resume the litigation.

Schelbert was entitled to object to the form of the proposed order, as she did, by arguing the court should only remand the matter if it was also prepared to dismiss the action, permitting her to appeal. But if the court agreed with her legal position, notwithstanding its comments during the hearing suggesting it believed it had the authority to order an interlocutory remand,[3] it should have presented MHH and the Joneses with the option of having their motion granted with that modification, withdrawing the motion entirely or withdrawing it as presented and submitting it in revised form to satisfy the court’s concerns as well as their own litigation-settlement strategy of being able to resume this litigation if the Commission did not approve the revised plan.[4]

The court’s involuntary dismissal of the action over the objection of the moving parties, if allowed to stand, would have significant adverse consequences to MHH and the Joneses. Although they have filed a new action challenging the Commission’s denial of a coastal development permit for their revised project, any challenge to the denial of their initial three-lot subdivision plan would be barred by the statute of limitations. (See Pub. Resources Code, § 30801 [challenge to Commission decision must be brought within 60 days].) Yet MHH and the Joneses at no time agreed to abandon their effort to obtain approval of the initial project if the Commission were to fail to issue a coastal development permit for the revised plan. Under these circumstances the dismissal was an abuse of discretion. (See Traweek v. Finley, Kumble, etc. Myerson & Casey (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1128, 1136 [“a court considering the dismissal of a case must have a substantial reason significant enough to overcome the legislative and judicial policy of this state that litigation should be disposed of ‘on the merits rather than on procedural grounds’”].)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed. Mt. Holyoke Homes, LP, Darla Jones and Stanley Jones are to recover their costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

PERLUSS, P. J.

We concur:

WOODS, J.

ZELON, J.

Courtesy of California Legal Resource Directory, a source for providers and consumers of legal resources. Because we know legal.

El Cajon Lawyers are available and standing by to help you.

[1] Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.

[2] Dismissal of an action is governed in large part by section 581, which enumerates a number of grounds upon which an action may be dismissed, including upon written request of the plaintiff; upon the written consent of all of the parties; by the court when no party appears for trial following 30 days’ notice; for delay in prosecution, as provided in sections 583.110 through 583.430; when either party fails to appear at trial and the other party appears and requests dismissal; if the plaintiff abandons the action; after a demurrer to the complaint is sustained without leave to amend or the plaintiff fails to amend during the allotted time if leave has been granted; after a motion to strike is granted without leave to amend or the plaintiff fails to amend during the allotted time if leave has been granted; and upon a motion to dismiss on the grounds of inconvenient forum. Although section 581, subdivision (m), notes the section is not “an exclusive enumeration of the court’s power to dismiss an action,” generally courts have limited exercise of their inherent power to dismiss an action to situations in which the plaintiff has failed to prosecute diligently or the complaint has been shown to be fictitious or a sham such that the plaintiff has no valid cause of action. (See Lyons v. Wickhorst (1986) 42 Cal.3d 911, 915.)

[3] This court in Rapid Transit Advocates, Inc. v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 996, 1003, held the trial court has the authority to make an interlocutory remand to an administrative agency, at least to permit clarification of ambiguous findings. The Court of Appeal in Resource Defense Fund v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 886, “respectfully disagree[d]” with our conclusion. (Id. at pp. 899-900 & fn. 5 [“Thus, the procedure for remanding the matter to the agency is a remedy to be employed when granting the writ; it is not, however, a procedure to be employed prior to such judgment.”]; see Sierra Club v. Contra Costa County (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1220-1222 [noting conflict in authority and holding “once the trial court concluded there were defects in the EIR’s range of alternatives, it erred by not issuing the writ of mandate and remanding the EIR” to the administrative agency].)

[4] Even Schelbert recognized there were viable alternatives to dismissal. During the hearing, when Schelbert was opposing the motion to remand, not the form of the order, Schelbert’s counsel argued, “Alternatively, the Petitioner could put this litigation on hold, something that I have done in a similar situation, and then they can do the same thing by filing the revised plan.” That, of course, is essentially what MHH, the Joneses and the Commission sought to do through their stipulation. However, once Schelbert lost her substantive argument the settlement had been negotiated in violation of the Brown Act, it appears her own litigation strategy was better served by opposing an interlocutory remand.