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Friday, December 02, 2005

Samantha S. v. Sup. Ct.

Filed 11/30/05 Samantha S. v. Sup. Ct. CA1/3


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS



California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.



IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA



FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT



DIVISION THREE










SAMANTHA S.,


Petitioner,


v.


THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SONOMA COUNTY,


Respondent;


SONOMA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,


Real Party in Interest.



A111676


(Sonoma County


Super. Ct. No. 1575-DEP)



Samantha S. has filed a writ petition challenging a juvenile court order terminating her reunification services and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] Samantha contends the court abused its discretion by finding that reasonable reunification services were provided by the Sonoma County Department of Human Services (the Department), and by finding that returning her daughter Autumn to her would be detrimental to the child. We disagree, and deny the petition.


On both issues raised by this petition, we review the record to determine whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s rulings. (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762, 763.) We must resolve all conflicts in support of those rulings, and draw all legitimate inferences to uphold the order, refraining from second-guessing the court’s conclusions. (Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.) We address the relevant evidence in connection with the arguments advanced by Samantha.


1. Adequacy of Reunification Services


Samantha does not dispute that the services provided to her were directed at the problems that led to the initiation of these dependency proceedings ¾ substance abuse and domestic violence. Rather, she faults her social worker for failing to follow up on arrangements for a parent educator, Judith Cain, to work with her in her home. These arrangements are not reflected in the written record, but both Ms. Cain and the social worker testified that plans were made for Cain to visit Samantha in her home in the period following December 2004 to supervise Samantha’s visits with Autumn.


Cain testified that she met with Samantha 14 times between April 2004 and December 2004. However, after the social worker asked her to supervise home visits that December, she never heard back from him. The social worker explained that after the plans for home supervision were made, he became very concerned about Samantha’s failure to visit with her son Andrew. Andrew, also a dependent of the court, was placed in a treatment facility separate from Autumn. Because Samantha was showing a lack of interest in Andrew, and failing to comply with that visitation component of her reunification plan, the social worker was reluctant to schedule visitation with Autumn in Samantha’s home.


This evidence shows that Samantha actually received a substantial amount of services from Cain. The social worker’s explanation for the failure to follow through on the arrangements for supervised home visits was not unreasonable. Samantha fails to establish any lack of substantial evidence on this point concerning the provision of reunification services.


Samantha also suggests the social worker was deficient for failing to contact her therapist after December 2004 to determine what progress she had made toward overcoming her denial of the problems leading to the children’s detention. She does not, however, dispute that she received the therapist’s services. Any lack of communication by the social worker with the therapist at this late stage of the reunification process does not undermine the court’s finding on the adequacy of the reunification services provided by the Department.


2. Evidence That a Return to Samantha Would Be Detrimental to Autumn


Samantha’s principal claim is that the evidence did not support a finding that returning Autumn to her custody would have been detrimental to the child. However, she did not ask the court at the hearing below for custody of Autumn. Rather, she requested six more months of reunification services. In this court, she does not challenge the court’s rejection of that alternative.


Given Samantha’s failure to raise this point below, we need not belabor the evidence supporting the court’s order. It is sufficient to note that, despite the case plan requirement that she refrain from using drugs and alcohol, Samantha admitted drinking at a picnic shortly before the latest hearing. The children’s father, who was at the same event, testified that Samantha was inebriated enough to stumble when she walked. The social worker testified that Samantha failed to consistently provide him with proof of attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous meetings, another requirement of her case plan. Samantha acknowledged that since this requirement was reiterated in a December 2004 memorandum, she had failed to consistently provide proof of attendance. “The failure of the parent [] to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental.” (§ 366.21, subd. (f).)


DISPOSITION


The petition is denied on the merits.


_________________________


Parrilli, J.


We concur:


_________________________


McGuiness, P. J.


_________________________


Pollak, J.


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[1] Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. Samantha’s writ petition refers to former California Rules of Court, rule 39.1B, which was repealed effective January 1, 2005. We deem the petition to have been based on the currently effective rule 38.1.


The Department notes that Samantha failed to personally sign the Notice of Intent to File Writ Petition. We provided Samantha’s counsel an opportunity to file a declaration establishing good cause for this failure. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 38(e)(3); Lisa S. v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 604.) Counsel has filed a declaration claiming that counsel mistakenly believed either she or her client could sign the form, and attaching a notice signed by Samantha. Under the circumstances, we will address the merits of the petition.

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