In re F.X.

Filed 11/29/05 In re F.X. CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

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In re F.X., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. F.X., Defendant and Appellant.	C048408 (Super. Ct. No. JV117789)

F.X. (the minor) admitted that with the intent of temporarily or permanently depriving the owner of possession of the car, the minor took or drove a 1993 Acura Integra that he knew to be stolen. (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a).) He was adjudged a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) and was committed to the Sacramento County Boys Ranch for a maximum term of five years, with “35 days custody time credits.”^[1] Following a contested restitution hearing, the minor was ordered to pay restitution to the victim in the amount of $5,917.09, including $5,061 for the car, which the victim’s insurance company determined to be a “total loss.”

On appeal, the minor contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering excessive victim restitution and erred in calculating his precommitment custody credits.

We shall affirm the commitment order as modified to award the minor an additional 18 days of precommitment custody credits.

DISCUSSION

I

Seeking compensation for the damage to her car and the loss of other property, the victim asked for restitution in the amount of $5,917.09, including $5,061.00 for the “cash value” of the car. Among other things, she submitted to the juvenile court a letter from her insurance company stating that her car had been declared a “total loss,” that the “actual cash value” of the car was $5,061, and that the insurance company would pay her this amount if she elected not to keep the car. The letter explained that “[t]he value of your vehicle was determined based on similar vehicles for sale in your local market, considering pre-accident condition, accessories, options and mileage.”

Finding the claim to be “reasonable,” the probation officer “recommended the minor make restitution to the crime victim . . . in the amount of $5,917.09 to fully compensate [her] for any loss.”

At the restitution hearing, the minor submitted documentation showing the “Kelley Blue Book” value for a 1993 Acura Integra RS in “excellent” condition and with the same mileage as the victim’s car was $3,925. Based upon this evidence, he argued “replacement cost is appropriately set at the excellent condition Kelley Blue Book value of [$3,925], not the [$5,061 that would be] paid by the insurance company.”

The juvenile court ordered the minor to pay victim restitution in the amount of $5,917.09. The court explained: “The letter from [the insurance company] . . . indicates that the insurance company did determine that there was a total loss, and that the value of the victim’s vehicle was determined based on similar vehicles for sale in the local market, considering pre-accident condition, accessories, options, mileage, et cetera. [¶] The amount that the insurance company came up with was [$5,061]. The Court is going to accept that, absent any further evidence from the minor . . . .”

The minor contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering $5,061 restitution for the car. He claims that (1) he established the replacement cost of the car was $3,925, (2) the court improperly used the actual cash value rather than replacement cost in determining the amount of restitution to be paid, and (3) the court “did not have a rational or factual basis to award $5061 as the actual cash value of the [victim’s car] because there was insufficient evidence.” We find no error.

Restitution orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People. v. Mearns (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 493, 498.) The court “must use a rational method that could reasonably be said to make the victim whole, and may not make an order which is arbitrary or capricious.” (Ibid.) When there is a factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered, no abuse of discretion will be found. (Id. at p. 499.)

Where a delinquent minor is adjudged to be a ward of the court, restitution is governed by Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6. (In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1131-1132.) Subdivision (a) of that section states in pertinent part: “[T]he court shall order the minor to pay, in addition to any other penalty provided or imposed under the law, . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [r]estitution to the victim or victims, if any, in accordance with subdivision (h).” Subdivision (h) states in pertinent part: “A restitution order . . . shall be of a dollar amount sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for all determined economic losses incurred as the result of the minor’s conduct . . . , including . . . [¶] . . . [f]ull or partial payment for the value of stolen or damaged property. The value of stolen or damaged property shall be the replacement cost of like property, or the actual cost of repairing the property when repair is possible.” (Italics added.)

The minor bore the burden of proving that the amount of restitution recommended in the probation report exceeded the replacement cost. (People v. Hartley (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 126, 130.) As we will explain, although the minor submitted evidence challenging the amount of restitution recommended by the probation report, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in relying on the insurance company’s valuation of the car. (Id. at p. 130, fn. 3 [the amount of insurance recovery the victim could obtain is evidence of the replacement value of the property].)

The Kelley Blue Book valuation cited by the minor contained the following caveat: “The final sale price may vary depending on the vehicle’s actual condition and local market conditions.” (Italics added.) The insurance company’s valuation took into account “similar vehicles for sale in [the] local market.” (Italics added.) Thus, the juvenile court reasonably could conclude the insurance company’s estimate more closely approximated the car’s replacement cost.

While the minor takes issue with the juvenile court’s use of “actual cash value” as opposed to the “replacement cost” of the car in setting restitution, he does not attempt to explain how the two differ under the circumstances of this case. The court apparently concluded that the two were synonymous, i.e., the victim would have to pay $5,061 to replace the car. Based on the record, this conclusion was reasonable.

We reject the minor’s claim that “[a]ll the juvenile court had before it was conclusionary [sic] language in the unsigned and unauthenticated letter from [the insurance company].” The court was “‘not required to determine what damages might be recoverable in a civil action but may instead use any rational method of fixing the amount of restitution which is reasonably calculated to make the victim whole . . . .’ [Citation.]” (People v. Goulart (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 71, 83.) “‘[S]entencing judges are given virtually unlimited discretion as to the kind of information they can consider’” in determining victim restitution. (People v. Foster (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 939, 946-947, quoting People v. Baumann (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 67, 81.)

There was not abuse of discretion in the amount of restitution.

II

In committing the minor to the Sacramento County Boys Ranch for a maximum term of five years, the juvenile court aggregated the periods of confinement on the minor’s previously sustained petitions. On one of those petitions, the minor was committed to the San Joaquin Juvenile Justice Center for 30 days on January 3, 2002; but the record shows that the minor was in custody for only 18 days, from January 3 to January 20, 2002. The court did not award credit for that time in custody.

According to the minor, the juvenile court erred in failing to award him an additional 30 days of credit for the time he spent in custody in San Joaquin Juvenile Hall in January 2002.

The People concede that the minor is entitled to an additional 18 days of custody credits. We agree and have jurisdiction to correct the error. (People v. Acosta (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 411, 428, fn. 8.)

“[A] minor is entitled to credit against his or her maximum term of confinement for the time spent in custody before the disposition hearing.” (In re Emilio C. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1067, citing Pen. Code, § 2900.5, subd. (a); In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 533-536.) “[W]hen a juvenile court elects to aggregate a minor’s period of physical confinement on multiple petitions . . . , the court must also aggregate the [precommitment] custody credits attributable to those multiple petitions.” (In re Emilio C., supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 1067; In re Eric J., supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 536; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 726, subd. (c).)

Accordingly, the minor is entitled to credit for the 18 days he spent in custody from January 3 to January 20, 2002.

He claims he is entitled to an additional 12 days of credit because he was committed to the San Joaquin County Juvenile Hall for 30 days on the April 9, 2001 petition. We disagree because, as previously noted, the minor spent only 18 days in custody on that petition.

DISPOSITION

The order of commitment is modified to award the minor an additional 18 days of precommitment custody credit. As modified, the order is affirmed.

SCOTLAND , P.J.

We concur:

NICHOLSON , J.

ROBIE , J.

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^[1] The 35 days of custody credits consisted of time the minor spent in custody in the Sacramento County Juvenile Hall and the San Joaquin County Juvenile Hall from August 27 to September 30, 2004. The minor’s claim that he “was not given any credit from September 23, 2004, to September 30, 2004, when [the minor] was committed to [the] Sacramento [County] Boy’s Ranch” in this case, is not supported by the record.