P. v. Ortiz

Filed 11/30/05 P. v. Ortiz CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RUBEN ORTIZ, Defendant and Appellant.

E037347 (Super.Ct.No. CRF0435081) OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Inyo County. Dean T. Stout, Judge. Affirmed.

Robin R. Scroggie for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Pamela A. Ratner Sobeck, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and David Delgado-Rucci, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pleaded no contest to one count of transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11590) and admitted that he was personally armed with a firearm during the offense (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (c)); in exchange, the remaining allegations were dismissed and defendant was promised a five‑year sentence. In accordance with the plea agreement, defendant was then sentenced to five years in state prison. Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion. We reject this contention and affirm the judgment.

I

FACTUAL BACKGROUND^[1]

Officer Charles D. Mairs worked for the California Highway Patrol (CHP) for six years and had a canine companion named “Kaos,” who was trained to detect the odors of marijuana, heroin, methamphetamine, and cocaine. Officer Mairs, who had about 200 hours of drug-related training himself, had training that qualified him to work with Kaos; he and Kaos trained at least two or three times a month, sometimes every day, on narcotics detection. Officer Mairs and Kaos had over 200 hours of training together, and had worked together every day for almost two years. Officer Mairs was also trained on how to know when Kaos had alerted to a controlled substance. In addition, Kaos had to demonstrate a level of proficiency before he could be sent to the field with Officer Mairs.

On January 7, 2004, about 11:50 a.m., Officer Mairs was southbound on Highway 395 near Tu Su Lane in Bishop when he made an enforcement stop on a vehicle driven by defendant. Defendant was driving a flat black or black primer painted 1987 Nissan pickup truck pulling a trailer. Officer Mairs stopped defendant because the pickup truck had no license plates, and the side front windows were tinted in violation of California law. Officer Mairs made contact with defendant through the right front door and advised him of the reason for the stop. Defendant appeared to understand and told Officer Mairs that the windows were okay because he had purchased the truck in Nevada. When asked for the vehicle’s registration and proof of insurance, defendant pointed to the right front window where a temporary sticker was affixed and told Officer Mairs that he could not locate the proof of insurance. Officer Mairs examined the temporary permit and noticed it bore the name of Israel Abel Martinez. Defendant had informed Officer Mairs that he had purchased the vehicle.

The appearance of the vehicle when Officer Mairs initially approached defendant aroused the officer’s suspicion. Defendant had an eight-foot U-haul trailer behind the pickup truck. The trailer was locked with two lug wrenches wrapped in plastic and wedged into the lock and then tied with green electrical wire. In addition, the steering column of the pickup truck had been removed, and the ignition was on top of the column. Officer Mairs believed the pickup might have been stolen.

Officer Mairs asked defendant if he had the telephone number for Mr. Martinez. Defendant gave the officer a telephone number, which Officer Mairs relayed to CHP dispatch. While waiting for a response from dispatch, Officer Mairs asked defendant if he had a receipt for the U-Haul. Officer Mairs wanted to ascertain if the U-Haul was rented to defendant since the officer’s suspicions were that the pickup truck did not belong to defendant. Defendant handed Officer Mairs three copies of the receipt, which indicated the U-Haul was rented to defendant. However, the officer opined it was odd that defendant had all three copies of the receipt, and none of the copies had defendant’s signature on it. Additionally, the receipt indicated that it was to be hauled by a 1988 Chevy pickup truck; defendant was driving a Nissan pickup from Nevada. Officer Mairs immediately thought the U-Haul might have been stolen also.

Officer Mairs then asked defendant what was in the U-Haul. Defendant responded the U-Haul contained several televisions, boxes, and clothing. When asked where the items had been purchased, defendant said he bought the items at a Wal-Mart store and handed the officer a receipt. Officer Mairs noted the receipt indicated stereos or electrical equipment had been purchased, not televisions. Officer Mairs then again asked defendant what the U-Haul contained. This time, defendant replied there was furniture, boxes, and clothes. Officer Mairs then asked defendant a third time what was in the U‑Haul, and defendant responded the trailer contained boxes and clothes but did not mention anything about televisions. Defendant’s inconsistent statements of the contents in the U-Haul as well as his suspicions of the ownership of the pickup truck and the U‑Haul aroused the officer’s suspicions that defendant might have been involved with some type of criminal activity.

About 10 minutes into the encounter, Sergeant McKiernan arrived in a separate patrol vehicle. Officer Mairs had Sergeant McKiernan speak with defendant to see if there was a way to contact the real owner of the vehicle. Officer Underwood arrived sometime after Sergeant McKiernan. While Sergeant McKiernan spoke with defendant outside the vehicle, Officer Mairs moved the pickup and U-Haul to an empty lot on Tu Su Lane for the purpose of allowing Kaos to sweep the vehicle without being injured by traffic. Officer Mairs then got Kaos and had Kaos do a canine sniff on the exterior of the pickup truck and the trailer. Kaos alerted while on the left side of the driver’s side door of the pickup and also at the rear of the trailer. Meanwhile, defendant stood outside being watched by Officer Underwood and Sergeant McKiernan; defendant was never placed in a patrol vehicle during this time.

Officer Mairs then asked defendant if he had a key to the trailer. After defendant gave Officer Mairs the key, Officer Mairs opened the trailer and saw a large jet ski wedged in the trailer ‑‑ an item defendant had not mentioned. Officer Mairs noted that the jet ski did not have a vehicle identification number (VIN) and placed defendant under arrest pursuant to Vehicle Code section 10751 (removal of a VIN). After the pickup and trailer were driven to the CHP office for “further investigation and to go through searching the trailer,” Officer Mairs found an empty speaker box containing two coffee cups. Inside the cups, Officer Mairs found methamphetamine. Officer Mairs noted that even if the vehicle and trailer had not been alerted to by Kaos, they would have been ultimately searched pursuant to an inventory search at the CHP office after defendant’s arrest.

On cross-examination, Officer Mairs explained that defendant had no problem with the English language; however, toward the end of the entire incident, about three and a half hours after the initial stop, defendant switched to Spanish and claimed he did not understand Officer Mairs. Officer Mairs also acknowledged that toward the end of the stop, before Kaos did a sweep of the trailer, Officer Mairs personally called the U‑Haul company and was informed that it was rented to defendant and that there was not a problem. Officer Mairs believed that there was criminal activity afoot with the pickup and testified that his purpose in obtaining Kaos to conduct a sweep of the pickup and trailer was to “disprove whether or not there was [sic] any drugs in the vehicle . . . .” When questioned what the basis for the suspicion that defendant might be involved in some narcotics activity, Officer Mairs explained, “I really had no basis. I was trying to dispel or disprove whether or not there was [sic] any drugs in the vehicle . . . .”

Following argument from counsel, the trial court denied defendant’s suppression motion, finding Officer Mairs had reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code violation to detain defendant. The court explained, “[Officer Mairs] articulated specific facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion to detain the vehicle based on the absence of license plates and what appeared to him to be after applied or illegal tint on the side driver’s window of the vehicle. [¶] Even if it was subsequently discovered that the vehicle was acquired or purchased from Nevada, the detention would still be justified and the violation would still exist by operating the vehicle with the tinted windows in California. [¶] It appears that upon effectuating that detention the officer observed in plain view from a place where he had a right to be certain facts that caused reasonable suspicion the vehicle may have been stolen, the truck, including the condition of the steering column and the ignition. The fact that the permit, once it was made known to him and he observed it, was in the name of another individual, not the defendant driver, occupant of the vehicle, and that the title was also in the name of another individual, Mr. Martinez, not that of the defendant, Mr. Ortiz. [¶] . . . [¶] [T]he detention here though while it may have been ultimately reached in the neighborhood of half an hour or so, given the ongoing developments in this case, the reasonable efforts of the officer to resolve the suspicious circumstances does not to this Court appear to be unreasonable. [¶] . . . [¶] I would also note that the defendant could not produce apparently an insurance card or proof of insurance or financial responsibility. That would appear to be a violation of Vehicle Code Section 16028A, which frankly may have or could have resulted in an arrest for that violation.”

In summary, the court found that the detention was neither unduly or unconstitutionally prolonged nor unjustified or unreasonable; that issues regarding ownership of the pickup truck had not been resolved even if the trailer had, in light of the condition of the steering column, ignition, names on the permit and title, and defendant’s inconsistent or evasive answers; that the dog sniff did not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; that Kaos and Officer Mairs had sufficient training, experience, and education that the dog’s alert and the officer’s interpretation of the dog’s alert were sufficient to give rise to probable cause for the officer to believe that there was contraband in the pickup and trailer that would justify a search; and that the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant and further search the vehicle pursuant to a search incident to a lawful arrest.

II

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion because the detention was unduly prolonged and exceeded the scope of the detention. He also claims the canine alert did not justify the warrantless search of the trailer. We disagree.

In reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings where supported by substantial evidence but exercise independent judgment to determine whether, on the facts found, the search was reasonable under Fourth Amendment standards. (People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 596-597, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Trujillo (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1219; Ornelas v. U.S. (1996) 517 U.S. 690, 696-697.)

As the finder of fact in a proceeding to suppress evidence, a trial court is “vested with the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences . . . .” (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673.) As there is nothing apparently false, inherently improbable, or physically impossible about the officer’s testimony, we are bound by the trial court’s determination that his testimony was credible.

It is a general principle of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that “the subjective intent of the law enforcement officer is irrelevant in determining whether that officer’s actions violate the Fourth Amendment.” (Bond v. U.S. (2000) 529 U.S. 334, 338, fn. 2.) As the United States Supreme Court said in a case involving the plain view doctrine, “evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer.” (Horton v. California (1990) 496 U.S. 128, 138; see also Whren v. U.S. (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 812-813 (Whren) [“‘[s]ubjective intent alone . . . does not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional’” and “‘the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action’”]; People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, 334 [“[t]he validity of a search does not turn on ‘the actual motivations of individual officers’”].)

An officer may stop a motorist if the stop is based on objectively reasonable suspicion that the driver has violated the Vehicle Code or some other law. (Whren, supra, 517 U.S. at p. 810; People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 926.) Defendant does not dispute the legality of the initial detention. Indeed, the record indicates defendant was stopped because the pickup had no license plates and the side front windows were tinted. These are violations of the Vehicle Code. Thus, Officer Mairs’s stop of defendant “was predicated upon probable cause that a Vehicle Code violation had occurred. Nothing more is required; the stop was proper.” (People v. Castellon (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1373; see also Whren, at p. 810 [“[a]s a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred”].) The fact that Officer Mairs did not issue a citation does not invalidate the stop.

Defendant, however, argues that even if the initial stop was valid, the detention was unreasonably prolonged for a simple traffic stop. We disagree. Having legally stopped defendant, the officer was entitled to detain defendant for the period of time necessary to discharge the duties related to the traffic stop. (People v. Brown (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 493, 496-497.) Nonetheless, the officer was not entitled to unreasonably extend the detention to “fish” for evidence of some other, unrelated offense without independent reasonable suspicion. (Williams v. Superior Court (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 349, 358 (Williams).) An investigatory stop exceeds constitutional bounds when extended beyond what is “reasonably necessary under the circumstances” that made its initiation permissible. (People v. McGaughran (1979) 25 Cal.3d 577, 586 (McGaughran).) In other words, while a routine traffic stop must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop (ibid.), an officer can prolong the detention if he or she discovers something suspicious during the course of the traffic stop. (People v. Valencia (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 906, 918.) Facts coming to light during the investigatory detention may provide reasonable suspicion to prolong the detention. (People v. Warren (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 991, 995-997.) There is no set time limit; the determination whether a detention was unduly prolonged is based upon whether the officers acted diligently in their reasonable investigation of their suspicions. (U.S. v. Sharpe (1985) 470 U.S. 675, 685-686.) In determining whether a detention is legal, reviewing courts consider the totality of the circumstances. (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 230-231.)

Here, based on the totality of the circumstances, we find that Officer Mairs was justified in prolonging the detention. Once the officer made contact with defendant, Officer Mairs noted that the steering column of the pickup, which was in plain view, was missing, and the ignition was not in its place. The officer also discovered that the title of the pickup truck was not in defendant’s name. In addition, defendant could not produce any insurance identification for the pickup, which was a violation of Vehicle Code section 10628 and could have resulted in an arrest, as the trial court noted. Officer Mairs then attempted to contact the person defendant claimed owned the vehicle to dispel his suspicions that the vehicle may have been stolen. The officer then noted suspicious evidence that the U-Haul trailer may have been stolen. The eight foot U-Haul was locked with two lug wrenches wrapped in plastic and wedged into the lock and then tied with green electrical wire to the pickup. When questioned about the contents in the U-Haul, defendant gave evasive and inconsistent answers. Defendant also gave three copies of the rental receipt from the U-Haul company, none of which had defendant’s signature on it. The officer also noted that the U-Haul was to be hauled by a 1988 Chevy pickup, and defendant was driving a Nissan pickup truck.

Based on the suspicions, the officer promptly took investigative steps to alleviate his concerns. The cumulating circumstances as set out above gave rise to a reasonable suspicion defendant was involved in criminal activity and gave the officer reason to prolong the detention. Under these circumstances, it was reasonable for an experienced officer to become suspicious that defendant was involved in a vehicle theft or illegal narcotics activity. As a reasonable means of dispelling these suspicions, Officer Mairs asked defendant questions and had Kaos sweep the vehicle and trailer for illegal narcotics. While the moving of the pickup and trailer off the highway for officer and canine safety may have prolonged the detention, as noted by the trial court, it was minimal, not unduly prolonged, and justified. In addition, although the officer had confirmed that the trailer had been rented to defendant, the officer was still unsure whether the pickup was stolen. Upon the canine search, more facts developed furthering the officer’s suspicions of illegal narcotics activity. Kaos twice alerted to the vehicle. At Officer Mairs’s request, defendant gave the officer the keys to the trailer, where a large jet ski with a missing VIN was found. Based on the foregoing, the officer had reasonable suspicion defendant was involved in criminal activity, and he was required to investigate the matter.

“In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant. [Citations.] A court making this assessment should take care to consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such cases the court should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing.” (U.S v. Sharpe, supra, 470 U.S. 675, 686.)

Here, Officer Mairs promptly pursued the swiftest and most reasonable way of confirming or dispelling his suspicions. He talked to defendant. The conversation was brief. There is no evidence Officer Mairs’s questions were accusatory in language or tone of voice. From the initial stop until Officer Mairs finished questioning defendant, there was only one officer at the scene; subsequently, two other officers arrived at the scene. Defendant was stopped on a public highway. The entire incident lasted approximately 30 minutes. Considering the totality of the circumstances and evidence coming to light as the officer spoke with defendant, that 30-minute detention was not excessive. (U.S. v. Sharpe, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 687 [20-minute investigative detention of motorist not unreasonable when officers have acted diligently and suspect’s actions contribute to the added delay]; People v. Dasilva (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 43, 50 [question is whether police diligently pursued means of investigation likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly while suspect was detained; 20-25 minute detention not unreasonable in view of circumstances presented].)

McGaughran, supra, 25 Cal.3d 577 and Williams, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d 349, relied on by defendant, are factually distinguishable.

In McGaughran, supra, 25 Cal.3d 577, an officer stopped a car for a traffic infraction, explained why he had stopped the car, and obtained and examined identification from the driver and his passenger. The officer then initiated a warrant check. Approximately 10 minutes later, the officer learned there were outstanding arrest warrants for both men. The men were arrested, and the car was searched. (Id. at pp. 581-582.) The McGaughran court found the officer had performed all the duties up to the point of giving the defendant a warning and releasing him. (Id. at p. 585.) However, “[i]nstead of promptly releasing defendant and his companion with such a warning, [the officer] returned to his patrol car and detained them for an additional period while he placed a call over police radio to inquire whether there were outstanding warrants in either name, and waited for an answer to that call. It is undisputed that this second period of detention lasted ‘approximately ten minutes.’” (Id. at p. 586.) The McGaughran court concluded that the additional 10-minute period was not reasonably necessary to the process of dealing with the initial offense, and therefore it was unconstitutional. (Id. at p. 587.)

In Williams, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d 349, the officer had obtained all the information he needed to perform his citation duties but prolonged the detention to determine whether the defendants were involved in a recent armed robbery, although the officer had seen nothing suspicious. (Id. at pp. 359-362.)

“McGaughran and Williams indicate that investigative activities beyond the original purpose of a traffic stop, including warrant checks, are permissible as long as they do not prolong the stop beyond the time it would otherwise take. [Citations.]

Thus, . . . law enforcement officers may routinely run warrant checks on traffic infraction detainees, provided the check does not unreasonably prolong the detention . . . . The government interest in apprehending individuals with outstanding arrest warrants outweighs the minimal inconvenience to that already lawfully experienced by the offender as a result of his or her traffic violation. [Citations].” (People v. Brown, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th 493, 498.)

In contrast to McGaughran and Williams, the officer here had reasonable suspicion to believe defendant was involved in criminal activity while he was initiating a legal traffic stop, as set out, ante. As the officer spoke with defendant, his suspicions escalated, so he proceeded with determining the legal owner of the pickup and the U-Haul as well as a canine sweep of the vehicle. Officer Mairs observed indicators of possible criminal activity as he was performing the duties associated with the traffic stop. These indicators supported a rational suspicion of criminal conduct and were more than a mere hunch. Although some of the indicators did not necessarily indicate criminal activity, “‘innocent behavior will frequently provide the basis for a showing of [reasonable suspicion]’”; “‘the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is “innocent” or “guilty,” but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts.’” (U.S. v. Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 10, quoting Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 243-244, fn. 13; see also People v. Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th 224, 233.)

In view of the foregoing, the trial court properly found that the detention was neither unduly prolonged nor unreasonable. The officer was reasonably justified in prolonging the detention as well as exceeding the scope of the detention to dispel his reasonable suspicions, which were based on articulated facts, that criminal activity was afoot.

Defendant also complains that the canine alert did not justify the opening and search of the trailer.

Initially, we note dog-sniffing investigations are neither intrusions nor invasions of anyone’s reasonable expectation of privacy. (U.S. v. Place (1983) 462 U.S. 696, 707; Illinois v. Caballes (2005) __ U.S. __ [125 S.Ct. 834, 836-837, 160 L.Ed2d 842]; People v. Mayberry (1982) 31 Cal.3d 335, 341.) Furthermore, exposing personal property to the sniff of a trained narcotics detecting dog is not a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes. (Mayberry, at p. 341; Place, at p. 707; see also People v. Salih (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1009, 1015.) Likewise, a canine sniff of a vehicle is not a “search” requiring probable cause. (U.S. v. DiCesare (9th Cir. 1985) 765 F.2d 890, 897.) In this case, the dog sniff was performed on the exterior of defendant’s pickup and trailer while he was lawfully seized for a traffic violation. Any intrusion on defendant’s privacy expectations does not rise to the level of a constitutionally cognizable infringement. (Place, at p. 707; Mayberry, at p. 341; see also People v. Bell (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 754, 769.)

Defendant argues that canine sniffs are unreliable and therefore insufficient to show probable cause. We recognize that federal decisions have stated a positive dog sniff test only supports probable cause where sufficient reliability is established. (U.S. v. Spetz (9th Cir. 1983) 721 F.2d 1457, 1464; see also U.S. v. Fernandez (9th Cir. 1985) 772 F.2d 495, 498, fn. 2.) Here, the trial court found Kaos to be sufficiently reliable. The court explained, “The training, education, training and experience of the officer and dog were sufficient that the dog’s alert and the officer’s interpretation of the dog’s alert were sufficient to give rise to probable cause for the officer to believe that there was contraband in the vehicle as well as the trailer that would justify a search.” This conclusion is supported by substantial evidence. Kaos was extensively trained to detect the odors of marijuana, heroin, methamphetamine, and cocaine. Officer Mairs had training that qualified him to work with Kaos; he and Kaos trained at least two or three times a month, with regular daily follow ups, on narcotics detection. Officer Mairs and Kaos had over two hundred hours of training together and had worked together every day for almost two years. Officer Mairs was also trained on how to know when Kaos had alerted to a controlled substance. In addition, Kaos had demonstrated a level of proficiency to be sent to the field with Officer Mairs.

There was no evidence that Kaos had been known to give a false alert, that he had a poor accuracy record, or that he acted confused. Moreover, decisions from other federal courts indicate that a specific record of an alerting dog’s prior accuracy is not required. (See U.S. v. Glover (2d Cir. 1992) 957 F.2d 1004, 1013 [“hit” by “narcotics dog” provided probable cause for search warrant]; U.S. v. Waltzer (2d Cir. 1982) 682 F.2d 370, 372-373; U.S. v. Johnson (2d Cir. 1981) 660 F.2d 21, 22 [sufficient probable cause provided by “specially trained” dog’s reaction and other unspecified factors indicating presence of drugs]; U.S. v. Knox (6th Cir. 1988) 839 F.2d 285, 294, fn. 4 [positive reaction by “Narcotics Unit dog alone” provides probable cause].) Defendant unpersuasively argues that Kaos’s reliability was not established. The trial court’s factual determination that Kaos was reliable is supported by Officer Mairs’s testimony regarding his and Kaos’s training and experience. (People v. Leyba, supra, 29 Cal.3d 591, 596-597.)

Consequently, Kaos’s immediate alert to the trailer and pickup, coupled with the factors noted previously, provided probable cause to search the trailer and its containers for contraband. (People v. Mayberry, supra, 31 Cal.3d 335, 342.)

Based on the foregoing, we find the trial court properly denied defendant’s suppression motion.

III

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

RICHLI

J.

We concur:

McKINSTER

Acting P.J.

GAUT

J.

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^[1] The factual background is taken from the suppression hearing held on October 15, 2004.